An artificially designed Turing Machine algorithm M o generates the instances of the satisfiability problem, and check their satisfiability. Under the assumption P = N P, we show that M o has a certain property, which, without the assumption, M o does not have. This leads to P = N P by modus tollens.
Introduction
This formula (P 1 → (P 2 → P 3 )) ∧ (¬(P 2 → P 3 )) concludes ¬P 1 by modus tollens. As an example, we may easily prove that: it is false that each of all numbers can be described by a finite-length digits. Simple proof is somehow showing the number of infinite-length digits. Instead, a boy makes use of the modus tollens as follows. He lets the propositions be: P 1 : each of all numbers can be described by a finite-length digits, P 2 : there exists the irrational number, P 3 : the irrational number can be described by a finite-length digits.
Then we know that P 1 → (P 2 → P 3 ) can be proved, and so can ¬(P 2 → P 3 ). In proving P = N P, we are going to follow his proof. Let P 1 be P = N P, P 2 an argument that an algorithm (say M o ) exists, and P 3 an argument on the property of M o . It will be seen that if P = N P then M o has the property of P 3 , otherwise it does not.
Algorithm M and Cook's Theory
Cook's Theory [1] says that the accepting computation of a non-deterministic poly-time Turing Machine on an input x can be transformed in a polynomial time to a satisfiable instance, denoted as c, of the satisfiability problem(SAT).
All the conditions of being an accepting computation are expressed, in c, as a collection of Boolean clauses. There are six groups of clauses in c. Quoted from [1] , each group imposes restrictions as: G 1 : at each time i, Turing Machine M is in exactly one state, G 2 : at each time i, the read-write head is scanning exactly one tape square, G 3 : at each time i, each tape square contains exactly one symbol from Γ, G 4 : at time 0, the computation is in the initial configuration of its checking stage for input x, G 5 : by time p(n), M has entered state q y and hence has accepted x, G 6 : for each time i, 0 ≤ i < p(n), the configuration of M at time i + 1 follows by a single application of the transition function δ from the configuration at time i.
Though the groups of clauses are designed to represent the runs of polytime Turing Machines, they can be modified to represent the runs of longertime ones. As long as there exists any finite-length accepting computation path from a problem instance to an accepting state over a Turing Machine, how long the path may be, there may exist the corresponding clauses for each of all the transitions along the path.
Therefore, we may extend the meaning of an accepting computation as the representation of a finite run of a Turing Machine on one of its accepting input, regardless of the run time. Note that, in [1] , the time for the transformation from an accepting computation to the corresponding SAT instance should have been kept within a polynomial, but the proof here does not regard any kind of run time, as long as the run is finite.
We may observe that the clauses in c can be divided into two parts: one is for the representation of the given input, and the other the run of the Turing Machine on the input. Let the input-part be the clauses for the description of the input x, which is denoted as c
x . Let the run-part (denoted as c r ) be the part of c such that the clauses for c x are cut off from c, i.e., c r is a part of c that actually represents the operations of the corresponding Turing Machine (grouped in [1] 
Let M be a Turing Machine algorithm, to which the input is a string denoted by y. M is designed to include a finite number of c r 's (i.e., c i from c i , where x is the input (represented by the initial configuration in G 4 ) of the computation that corresponds to c i . According to the run-parts included, countably many M's can be constructed, and they can be somehow ordered as:
Given an input y, during the run of M i , c y and c r ij are concatenated, forming c ij (1 ≤ j ≤ m). For each c ij , the module of SAT-solver, which will accordingly be chosen to be either a deterministic algorithm or non-deterministic, performs the run for the satisfiability check. If c ij is satisfiable then M i increases its counter, and goes on to the next c; this process repeats up to c im . At the end of the counting, M i accept y if the counter holds an odd number. That is, the task of M, at the given input of a finite string y, is to count the number of satisfiable c's, and accept y if the counted number is odd. Observe that it is not impossible for c ij to be satisfiable though the chances are usually rare, and that the run time of M i shall be finite because each of all the satisfiability check will take a finite time. These observations ensure that M i determines a set of acceptable strings, supporting M i to be a Turing Machine. o runs deterministically and the SAT-solver module runs deterministically in a poly-time for the length of c. Analogously, we may have N D sat , by which M o runs non-deterministically and the SAT-solver module runs non-deterministically in a poly-time for the length of c. Theorem 1. P = N P Proof. Let P 1 , P 2 and P 3 be the following propositions:
By modus tollens, (
is to show that if M o exists then there exists t, which is D sat , when P = N P is the antecedent.
By P = N P, there exists a deterministic poly-time SAT-solver, so the SATsolver module in M o can be implemented to be a deterministic algorithm, which runs in a poly-time for the length of c. Thus, t can be D sat .
2) For the latter part, we are to show ¬(P 2 → P 3 ). By the inference rule, if P 2 is true then a contradiction from P 2 → P 3 implies ¬(P 2 → P 3 ).
We can show that P 2 is true, as follows. For any chosen c o , build two nondeterministic particular transition tables for ac M o and ac c o separately, and then merge the two so that one of the two computations can be chosen selectively from the starting state during the run. M o may exist by this t, which is N D sat . Next we are to derive a contradiction from P 2 → P 3 . Observe that P 2 → P 3 implies specifically this argument: if M o exists then there exists t, which is D sat particular transition table for both ac M o and ac c o . Then, by the argument together with the definition (of M o ) that ac M o and ac c o are the accepting computations that share the same input, it is concluded that both ac M o and ac c o are exactly the same computation, i.e., all the transitions of the configurations of ac M o and those of ac c o are exactly the same.
According to [1] , with the assignment of the truth-values, which are acquired by the SAT-solver module, to the the clauses of c o , we later may acquire ac c o in the form of the sequence of transitions of configuration of a Turing Machine. Now, let i be the number of the transitions between the configurations in ac M o , j the number of the clauses of c o , and k the number of the transitions between the configurations in ac c o .
Since, at the least, all the clauses of c o should once be loaded on the tape of the Turing Machine as well as other c's, we may have i > j, and since it is addressed in [1] that each transition of an accepting computation is described by more than one clauses, we may have j > k, resulting i > j > k.
However, i = k because it is concluded above that both ac M o and ac c o are exactly the same computation. This is a contradiction from (P 2 → P 3 ).
As a commentary, to make sure that the proof does not fall into the similar oddity of the well-known relativizations of Pvs.N P, it'd be better to consider this argument:
Similarly, by the antecedent P = N P, there exist only non-deterministic algorithm for the SAT-solver module, so Q 1 → (Q 2 → Q 3 ) can analogously be proved. For the latter part, ¬(Q 2 → Q 3 ) become true if Q 2 → Q 3 implies i = k, as in the proof. If so, we have the result that P = N P.
However, Q 2 → Q 3 may imply i = k if ac M o and ac c o are the same, but we know, referring to the proof, that there is no such t that makes ac M o and ac c o the same. In fact, we may build many t's that does not incur i = k from Q 2 → Q 3 , as mentioned in the proof.
Replies to the Critiques
Followings are the replies to the critiques. Replies to future critiques will be added below. Author does not expect the success of the proof, rather he is waiting to see what is wrong in [2] . 0.1 Replies to the Critique of J. Kim's "P is not equal to NP by Modus Tollens"
It is quite likely that the Critique of [3] has errors. Authors of [3] has a good understanding on [2] , but missed some points.
The tables in 2.4 of [3] are exactly what the author of [2] expected. (Thanks.) "3.1 Invalidity of logical argument " of [3] said that 't is D sat ' is a fact, but t can also be N D sat especially when the SAT-solver module is implemented non-deterministically. Notice that the TM algorithms designed for the proof are not practical programming. As a result, 't is D sat ' is not always true. In addition, M o may exist when t is N D sat .
For 3.2 of [3] , the author of [2] would rather choose "3.2.2 Second interpretation." The critique mentioned : "Note that these accepting computations are not necessarily the same as the accepting computations produced by their respective Turing machines transition tables."
Author of [2] agree with this, but, for the proof of [2] , it is enough if there exist more than one cases that the accepting computations are the same as the accepting computations produced by their respective Turing machines transition tables. The proof derives the contradiction from one of the cases. The case can be seen by the merged table in 2.4. In 3.3, the critique said "At the end of his paper, Kim verifies that . . . ." The part, 'the end of his paper,' is to show that the proof will not be fallen into the relativizations of Pvs.N P. The author of [2] wanted to show that if the proof is correct then there is no room for the proof to be fallen into the relativization matters. Perhaps, this part can be omitted for now, while questioning on the correctness of the proof itself.
Comments Authors of [3] show a good understanding on [2] , but have the errors as above that seem to imply that [2] has not yet been refuted.
